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Summary 
This working paper was written as part of the first phase of the Coping with 
Fragmentation Project (CONNECT), a four year research project that aims to advance 
the understanding of the increasing fragmentation of global governance architectures 
across a number of policy domains, explain and analyze its causes and consequences 
and suggest policy responses. The project is hosted by the Department of 
Environmental Policy Analysis (EPA), Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) of the VU 
University Amsterdam and is also part of Amsterdam Global Change Institute (AGCI). 
CONNECT aims to establish an international research network on fragmentation and 
regime complexes over the next years. CONNECT is endorsed by the IDHP Earth 
System Governance Project. 
As the issue of fragmentation of global environmental governance moved to the centre 
of debate on governance performance and effectiveness in addressing environmental 
problems, it attracted scholars from both international law and political science. Each 
of the disciplines have provided a set of valuable insights into the cases of 
fragmentation based on distinct analytical approaches and models. However, there is a 
clear lack of consensus in the literature on conceptualization and various typologies of 
fragmentation, its causes and consequences as well as views on management 
approaches. Accordingly, this paper reviews and maps this burgeoning body of 
research with the aim to contribute to these debates by offering a structured literature 
review on the various conceptualizations of fragmentation of global governance, 
identify common analytical themes and touch upon possibilities for integrated 
research. 
As this literature review paper illustrates, the concept of fragmentation has evolved 
from various legal debates on strengthening the overall international system of law 
and ensuring legal certainty to resembling the literature on global environmental 
governance in the context of today‘s transformations of world politics. Furthermore, 
we conclude that the concept of fragmentation within the framework of global 
governance architecture appears as a promising lens where each of the different 
perspectives within international law and political science could theoretically and 
methodologically merge. Moreover, when considering common analytical problems 
that each of the disciplines addresses, namely mapping and measuring the degree of 
fragmentation, examining its causes and consequences and management approaches, 
one can conclude that the different accounts of these analytical problems are 
essentially not conflictive, but instead complementary to each other. Therefore, one 
would need to employ a whole spectrum of perspectives, approaches and tools in 
order to address these four analytical themes associated with the fragmentation of 
global governance and accordingly propose concrete management and policy options 
for increasing the overall institutional performance in terms of sustainable 
development. 
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1 Introduction 
Ever since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, through the 
1992 Earth Summit and Agenda 21 and until the highly anticipated Rio+20 conference 
on sustainable development held in 2012, the question of how to address the 
challenges pertaining to global environmental change has been at the core of 
negotiations. However, despite more than 1000 environmental treaties that have been 
developed over the last 40 years, anthropogenic factors are still the major drivers of 
global environmental change. Scientists argue that if the human-induced pressures on 
the environment continue in the same pace, it would trigger abrupt or irreversible 
environmental change with catastrophic consequences for human well-being 
(Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2005). According to a recent scientific 
assessment, such developments require fundamental reorientation and reconstruction 
of national and international institutions toward more effective and legitimate earth 
system governance1 and planetary stewardship (Biermann et al., 2012). In other words, 
questions on how to reform and evolve global institutions responsible for ensuring 
sustainable development in an effective and legitimate way are at the heart of debates 
in academic research as well as in policy processes and negotiations. 
However, it is highly problematic that the specific and the overall effectiveness of 
emerging mechanisms of global environmental governance remains poorly understood 
(Biermann and Pattberg, 2008). Most research on global governance either stays 
confined to exploring intensive single-case studies of the effectiveness and 
performance of a single and distinct institution to solve particular governance 
challenges or on the theoretical accounts of the overall phenomena. Only recently have 
scholars began to investigate more systematically the middle level, that is the 
overarching system of institutions and novel governance mechanisms in particular 
areas of world politics that we define as governance architecture.2 More precisely, 
based on the work of Biermann and colleagues (2009) we define architecture as the 
overarching system of public and private regulations and decision-making procedures 
– that is organizations, regimes and other forms of principles, norms, regulations and 
decision making processes- that are valid or active in a given issue area of world 
politics. 
The CONNECT project focuses on one aspect of global governance architecture that is 
increasingly moving to the centre of debates on governance performance and 
effectiveness in addressing environmental problems - the increased fragmentation of 
global governance architecture in distinct issue areas of world politics. Today, we 
observe a trend towards policy domains that are marked by a patchwork of 
international and transnational institutions that are different in their character 
(organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies (public, non-profit, 
                                               
1 Earth system governance is a core challenge of the international Earth System Governance 
Project and is defined as ―the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and 
informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor-networks at all levels of human society (from 
local to global) that are set up to steer societies towards preventing, mitigating, and 
adapting to global and environmental change and, in particular, earth system 
transformation, within the normative context of sustainable development‖ (F.Biermann et al., 
2010). For more information of the Earth System Governance Project, visit 
www.earthsystemgovernance.org. 
2 The analytical problem of architecture is one of the five core analytical problems of the Earth 
System Governance Project. It includes questions relating to the emergence, design and 
effectiveness of governance systems as well as the overall integration of global, regional, 
national and local governance (F.Biermann et al., 2010). 
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for-profit), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), their subject matter (from 
specific policy fields to universal concerns) (Biermann et al., 2009), as well as actor-
networks and their underlying discursive formations. Such developments led to 
fundamental transformations of world politics where fragmentation becomes a 
necessary structural characteristic and quality of global governance architectures in 
and beyond the environmental domain (Zelli and van Asselt, 2012). Therefore, we 
conceive of such situations as fragmented global governance architecture. The concept 
of fragmentation of global governance architecture explores the overall institutional 
setting in which distinct institutions exist and interact instead of merely exploring the 
dyadic interlinkages between different institutions (e.g. between CBD and TRIPS under 
WTO) and policy domains (e.g. environment-trade linkages) (Biermann et al., 2009). 
The environmental governance architecture of distinct issue areas is a prime example 
of fragmentation since not only are the environmental arrangements located at the 
intersection of many other arrangements including trade, public health, human rights, 
and poverty eradication, but also the very framing of issues involving human-
environment interaction is changing (Young, 2008). For example, in the case of climate 
governance, its architecture appears as highly fragmented. It is characterized by a 
combination of international and transnational institutions operating at different scales 
that are not always connected to the overarching climate convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol (e.g. the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, the 
Methane to Markets Partnership, the Carbon Disclosure Project, etc.), then by different 
types of norms (e.g. those that are addressing the climate issues through 
consumption-based accounting to those that use market mechanisms to pursue 
environmental goals or mainstream climate change issues into sustainable 
development); moreover it is marked with multiplicity of actors such as private for 
profit, private for non-profit or public-private initiatives and their actor-constellations, 
as well as with different discursive formations of climate change issue (e.g. an 
environmental degradation problem, a development issue, a security issue, etc.) 
(Harris and Symons, 2013; Vlassopoulos, 2012; F. Biermann et al., 2010). In the issue 
area of energy governance, one can observe the same phenomena occurring. It is 
marked by a plethora of institutions operating at different scales (e.g. UN-Energy, the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the International Partnership on 
Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), G8, the IEA, 
etc.), with different norms (e.g. energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear power, etc.), 
different actor-constellations and discursive formations (e.g. energy as part of risk 
discourse, energy as a question of national security, etc) (Colgan et al., 2012; 
Fernández Carril et al., 2013; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2010). 
Accordingly, the issue of fragmentation attracted scholars from both international law 
and political science where each of the disciplines based on distinct analytical 
approaches and models have provided a set of valuable insights into the cases of 
fragmentation as well as distinct management approaches evolving over time. 
However, there is a clear lack of consensus in the literature on conceptualization and 
various typologies of fragmentation, its causes and consequences as well as views on 
management approaches. Accordingly, this paper reviews and maps the burgeoning 
body of research on the concept of fragmentation of global environmental governance 
within the studies of international environmental law and world politics, synthesizes 
various theoretical and empirical accounts on its causes and consequences and 
examines various proposed management options. The primary aim is to contribute to 
these debates by offering a structured literature review on the various 
conceptualizations of fragmentation of global governance, identify common analytical 
themes and touch upon possibilities for integrated research. The literature review is 
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conducted as part of the first phase of the broader CONNECT project, which aims to 
address these analytical themes more systematically and subsequently bridge research 
gaps based on the integration of research from the international law and political 
science perspectives. 
This literature review is guided by the methodological tools developed by Arksey and 
O‘Malley (2005) and is conducted in three phases within the overall iterative process of 
searching and synthesis. The initial phase attempts to map the evolution of the 
conceptual accounts of the issue of fragmentation of global environmental governance 
in the existing literature within the disciplines of international law and political 
science. Considering that the scope of research is limited to the fragmentation of 
global governance, theoretical accounts addressing vertical fragmentation below the 
international level, such as polycentric or multilevel governance, are not integrated in 
the review; instead the aim is to address those accounts that could be applicable to 
any given level of horizontal governance. The authors, however, recognize such 
possible limitations. Secondly, as distinct conceptual accounts of the issue of 
fragmentation were found to address common analytical themes from different 
perspectives, the second phase of the literature review was induced. The second phase 
identifies these common analytical themes that are subsequently explored in more 
detail. Finally, avenues for further integrated research are discussed. Therefore, the 
paper is structured according to the common analytical themes identified during the 
process of literature review on the concept of fragmentation of global environmental 
governance. In the first part, we present distinct conceptualizations of fragmentation 
within these two disciplines. In the second part, we synthesize various theoretical and 
empirical accounts on mapping and measuring various types and degrees of 
fragmentation, its causes and consequences and finally management approaches. 
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2 The conceptual evolution of fragmentation 
2.1 International law perspectives 
 
Much of what is considered today under the concept of fragmentation has evolved out 
of earlier debates on the effectiveness and possibility of strengthening the overall 
system of international law ever since the mid-nineteenth century (Martineau, 2009). 
International law scholars particularly focused on examining overlaps among treaties 
by utilizing the concept of treaty congestions (Brown Weiss, 1993; Hicks, 1998). More 
recently, besides examining the proliferation of treaties, legal debates moved to 
include discussions of normative conflicts and legal techniques for solving them under 
the banner of conflicts (Gerstetter et al., 2007; Techera and Klein, 2011) or 
fragmentation (Boyd, 2010; Commission, 2006; Pauwelyn, 2002; Van Asselt, 2011) in 
international law. Finally, in light of recognizing the incremental transformations of 
world politics, the interest in legal pluralism appeared as a conceptual tool for framing 
fragmentation (Michaels, 2009; Burke-White, 2003). 
The concept of treaty congestion was primarily used to describe the problems of treaty 
conflicts, treaty obligation and objective conflicts, and procedural conflicts as a direct 
result of the proliferation of international treaties (Hicks, 1998). The assumption is 
that the problem of treaty congestion is expected to increase as the number of 
multilateral environmental treaties continues to expand in an uncoordinated fashion 
and without strengthening the effectiveness of existing ones (Anton, 2012). Moreover, 
two major problems associated with treaty congestion have been identified: namely 
the lack of states‘ capacity and of international system to monitor, implement and 
comply with the plethora of new obligations; and secondly, the proliferation of 
uncoordinated international environmental law resulting in uncoordinated obligations, 
overlapping norms, and outright duplication (Brown Weiss, 1993). The case studies of 
treaty congestion include exploring the conflicts between the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the International Tropical 
Timber Agreement (ITTA) that arose over the divergent normative frameworks for the 
management of mahogany (e.g. sustainable development vs. conservation) (Hicks, 
1998). 
Moreover, much of the international law literature focuses on examining the 
relationship among treaties in order to identify conflicts of normative frameworks and 
propose legal techniques for solving them. For example, considering the relationship 
between the International Treaty on Plant Generic Resources (ITPGRFA) on the one 
hand and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and 
the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) on the other, Gerstetter and colleagues (2007) 
examined potential legal conflicts that may arise among them and proposed the 
implementation of interpretative rules based on the identification of common goals as 
a conflict resolution technique. Others explored institutional overlaps in treaties 
regulating the management of sharks arguing that conflicts of interest between 
conservation efforts on one side and those involved in trade and commercial 
exploitation of marine species on another is the main cause of conflicts and thus it is 
crucial to strengthen the coherence of legal strategies (Techera and Klein, 2011). 
Furthermore, the concept of fragmentation of international law started to have a 
particular resonance when the International Law Commission (ILC) included it in its 
long term programme in 2000, established a special Study Group in 2002 and finally 
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released a special report on fragmentation in 2006. The ILC report provides an 
extensive overview of debates raised with increased fragmentation of international law 
and offers international layers a toolbox for addressing such challenges. It includes the 
analysis of potential conflicts that may arise among diverging norms and regimes at 
different levels in the context of the transforming international law system, as well as 
techniques for resolving these conflicts (Commission, 2006). The report goes on to 
emphasise the flaws in traditional state-centric international law in regulating such 
emerging arrangements and concludes that fragmentation should be viewed as 
constitutive of international law with both negative and positive aspects (ibid.). 
However, in face of emerging complexity associated with multi-actor interactions 
across different levels, plurality of normative orders, environmental law and regulation 
have gone through the process of transformation and the traditional understandings of 
the Westphalian state system have become highly debatable. Moreover, much of the 
international law scholars began to recognize that there is a considerable mismatch 
between the scale of highly complex and multidimensional environmental problems 
and the existing legal and political order and authority to steer the world community 
toward a solution (Singh, 2011; Van Asselt, 2011);. For example, it is argued that the 
UN collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (UN-REDD)3 has significantly challenged the traditional legal conception of 
forests and their relationship to state sovereignty by putting an economic value on 
forests and assigning them an important function as carbon sinks in the systems that 
are global in scale, thus reconceptualising legal rights and obligations (Boyd, 2010). 
Moreover, it is argued that the recent Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreement 
show the limitations of the existing United Nations system as a leader in climate 
governance (Boyd, 2010). In conclusion, many argue that the difficulties facing 
international climate policy resulted from an unrealistic embrace of top-down 
approaches to the problem and lack of consideration for the realities of a plural, 
fragmented international legal and political order (Boyd, 2010; Singh, 2011; Van 
Asselt, 2011). 
Accordingly, much of the studies of global environmental law start to resemble the 
literature on global environmental governance and the interest in legal pluralism 
emerged as a conceptual tool for framing fragmentation. Burke-White (2003) argues 
that the emerging international legal system is best described as pluralist, meaning 
that it is neither fully fragmented nor completely unitary. Instead it includes a range of 
different and equally legitimate norms prolongated by different set of actors within the 
context of a universal system (ibid.). Central to legal pluralism is the conception of the 
world as constituted by a diversity of legal and non-legal normative orders that coexist 
with the laws and norms of particular states thus challenging a perceived monopoly of 
the state in making and administering law (Michaels, 2009). Accordingly, recognizing 
pluralism and fragmentation as the basis for the studies on effectiveness and 
legitimacy of global environmental law implies moving away from a top-down, 
comprehensive global governance as a normative standard of effective governance to 
understanding the complexity and multitude of actors, institutions, laws and values 
and the complexity of environmental problems (Burke-White, 2003). 
                                               
3 The UN-REDD Programme, launched  in 2008, is an effort to create a financial value for the 
carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions 
from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. [URL: 
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx, assessed 13. 06. 2013] 
 IVM Institute for Environmental Studies 
Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance Architectures 13 
    
 
2.2 Political science perspectives 
Recognizing the shift from government to governance, political science and 
International Relations scholars employ various concepts and theoretical approaches in 
order to provide relational and explanatory accounts of the various underlying 
variables of fragmentation, such as power and problem structure, norm or interest 
conflicts, actor constellations or discourses in which these institutions are embedded. 
Moreover, from the 1970s onwards fragmentation of institutional arrangements was 
the focus of scholarly debates in political science as well, however under different 
conceptual and typological accounts, including interlocking institutions in the 1970s, 
followed by more recent studies in the mid-1990s onwards on institutional 
interlinkages, overlaps  or interplay (Aggarwal, 1998; Oberthür and Stokke, 2011; 
Young, 2002) and recently followed by the concept of regime complex  (Keohane and 
Victor, 2010; Raustiala and Victor, 2004), most of which stem from the disciplines of 
International Relations and institutional economics. 
Current research on institutional interplay or interaction is largely based on the 
debates surrounding the work on institutional effectiveness that emerged in the 
1990s. Whereas early research on institutional effectiveness focused on examining the 
impact of individual institution on their own governance domain, institutional interplay 
examines the effects that one institution has on the development or performance of 
another institution and their overlapping areas of governance (Oberthür and Stokke, 
2011; Young, 2002). Institutional interplay can occur both horizontally (e.g. 
interactions between trade regimes and environmental regimes operating at the 
international level) and vertically (e.g. interactions between local systems of land 
tenure and national regulatory systems dealing with matters of land use) (Young, 
2002). Empirical analysis of institutional interplay has focused on examining a dyadic 
interaction among the institutions governing different domains, including trade-
environment interaction (Gehring, 2011; Sampson and Chambers, 2002), such as 
between the climate change regime and the trade regime (Charnovitz, 2003); bio 
safety and trade (Young et al., 2008); between the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the climate change regime (Van Asselt et al., 2005); between the climate change 
regime and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Oberthür, 2006); 
institutional interaction within one regime such as international climate change regime 
(Oberthür, 2001); and finally the institutional interaction within particular geographic 
area or region such as the North Sea, the Arctic, the Antarctic or the Coral Triangle. 
Raustiala and Victor (2004) expanded the research focus arguing that the proliferation 
of institutions and its costs and benefits can be conceptualized as a regime complex.  
A regime complex is ‖an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions 
governing a particular issue-area that are marked by the existence of several partly 
overlapping and non-hierarchical legal agreements created and maintained in distinct 
flora with participation of different actors‖ (Raustiala and Victor, 2004, p.279). 
Moreover, Keohane and Victor (2010) advanced the concept of regime complex and 
introduced a continuum where on one extreme there are fully integrated institutions 
operating through comprehensive, hierarchical rules and on the other there are highly 
fragmented institutions with no identifiable core and weak linkages between regime 
elements. Sitting in between is ―a wide range that includes nested (semi hierarchical) 
regimes with identifiable cores and non-hierarchical but loosely coupled systems of 
institutions‖ (Keohane and Victor, 2010, p.4). 
This line of research has provided valuable insights into the cases of institutional and 
normative fragmentation among treaties and other emerging modes of governance 
based on distinct analytical approaches and models. However comparative, empirical 
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and theory driven analysis of institutional overlaps from the overall institutional setting 
is considerably underemployed. Finally, in light of recognizing the complexity of 
environmental problems and emerging new modes of governance, scholars aimed at 
integrating both legal and political perspectives in efforts to explain and assess 
implications of the fragmentation of global environmental governance, and the 
fragmentation of global environmental governance architectures appeared as the 
latest interdisciplinary concept (Biermann et al., 2009). 
The concept of global governance architectures is broader than the concept of 
international regimes as it allows for the study of both synergy and conflict between 
different regimes and institutional arrangements, and the norms and principles in 
which these interactions are embedded (F. Biermann et al., 2010). Yet, it is narrower 
than the concept of order since it is more suitable for examining distinct issue areas of 
global governance (ibid.). Finally, the concept of fragmentation within the framework 
of global governance architectures is broader than the concept of institutional 
interlinkages, overlaps, or interplay since it explores the overall institutional setting in 
which distinct institutions exist and interact instead of merely exploring the 
interlinkages between different institutions (e.g. between CBD and TRIPS under WTO) 
and policy domains (e.g. environment-trade linkages) (Biermann et al., 2009). The 
global governance architectures of a given issue area encompasses different 
organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and 
procedures addressing other issues beside the main subject area (Zelli, 2011). An 
important contribution of the concept of governance architectures is that it allows for 
the comparative analysis of different degrees and types of fragmentation in different 
issue areas as many policy domains are not regulated or dominated by a single 
international regime, but are instead marked by arrangements that are different in 
their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constitutiencies 
(public or private), spatial scope (from bilateral to global) and subject matter from 
specific policy fields to universal concerns).  
Fragmentation is used as a relative concept, as all global governance architectures are 
fragmented to some degree and consists of distinct parts that are hardly ever fully 
interlinked and integrated (Biermann et al., 2009). Non-fragmented, ―universal‖ 
architectures are theoretically conceivable as opposite of fragmentation. The concept 
of architectures and fragmentation is considered to be value-free in a sense that 
neither pre-existing order nor normative standards leading to a particular order are 
part of the assumption. On the other hand, architectures arose in a decentralized and 
hardly planned manner during the processes of institutionalization without a necessary 
existence of ‗architects‘. Third, empirical research on fragmentation of global 
governance architectures depends on the perceived scale of the problem. 
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3 Common analytical problems 
Based on our discussion of the current fragmentation literature, we have identified 
four common analytical problems that are the subject of the coming sections. First, we 
present various attempts to map and measure the degree of fragmentation. Secondly, 
we examine various theoretical accounts explaining the causes of fragmentation, while 
in the third section we present arguments about the consequences of fragmentation. 
Fourth and finally, various approaches for managing fragmentation are identified. 
3.1 Mapping different types and degrees of fragmentation 
As a discussion on conceptualizing different types and degrees of fragmentation 
emerged in an effort to assess which type or degree of fragmentation promises higher 
institutional performance, scholars attempted to either deductively or inductively come 
up with different taxonomies of fragmentation. Accordingly, in this chapter, we will 
first present various conceptualizations of different taxonomies of fragmentation, and 
secondly discuss various attempts to empirically map fragmentation and subsequently 
measure its degree. 
Much of the foundational work in mapping and measuring the degree of fragmentation 
has been made in the context of institutional interaction at an international level. In his 
groundbreaking writings on institutional interactions at the international level, Young 
(1996) introduced a typology of four types of institutional linkages, called embedded, 
nested, clustered and overlapping institutions. He observed that issue-specific regimes 
are often embedded in overarching institutional arrangements with exclusive authority 
and sovereignty over decision making and membership (e.g. the 1973 Agreement on 
Conservation of Polar Bears, the Antarctic Treaty System). The second type considers 
linkages where smaller institutional arrangements are nested into broader institutional 
frameworks dealing with the same issue area but are narrower in scope (e.g. nesting of 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) umbrella). Thirdly, clustering occurs when several specific arrangements form 
more generic framework based on a common concern for a problem issue (e.g. the 
Law of the Sea). Finally, of particular significance to research on fragmentation is a 
fourth type, namely overlapping linkages where individual arrangements formed 
independently of each other intersect on a de facto basis thus having a significant and 
often but not always unintended impact on each other (e.g. WTO and MEAs) (Young, 
1996, p. 7). 
Taking a different approach, based on concepts such as organizational learning, 
legitimacy and utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, Oberthür and Stokke (2011) distinguish 
between three types of institutional interplay: ideational, normative and utilitarian. 
Ideational interplay relates to ―process of learning‖ where the substantive and 
operational rules of one institution serve as models for those negotiating another 
regime. Normative interplay refers to situations where substantive and operational 
norms of one institution either contradict or validate those of another institution, while 
utilitarian interplay relates to situations where decision taken within one institution 
alter the costs and benefits of options available in another. 
Drawing upon the work of Young (1996) and Oberthür and Stokke (2011), various 
other scholars introduced their own typologies of linkages with minor variations. Scott 
(2011), for example, introduced embedded (when regimes operate within one realm, 
e.g. public international law), overlapping or functional, behavioural/cognitive 
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(institutional learning) and nested. Alter and Meunier (2009) considered institutional 
linkages as only nested, partially overlapping and parallel, while Aggarwal (2005) 
considered them as nested, horizontal, overlapping and independent. 
The different taxonomies for institutional interaction have helped to map interaction 
between institutional arrangements, however, only recently has the literature focused 
on measuring the degree of fragmentation. Within global environmental governance 
architectures, Biermann and colleagues (2009)  offer a typology of different degrees of 
fragmentation they describe as synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive fragmentation. 
The degree of fragmentation is determined by three indicators including institutional 
integration, norm conflict and actor constellations. Synergistic situations occur when 
there is one core institution in which other institutions are closely integrated; core 
norms are integrated; and all relevant actors support the same institution. Cooperative 
situations occur when core institutions are closely integrated with other institutions; 
core norms are not in conflict; and some actors remain outside the main institutions, 
however, they maintain cooperation. Conflictive situations occur when there are 
different and largely unrelated institutions; core norms are in conflict; and major 
actors support different institutions (Biermann et al., 2009). 
Moreover, as scholars recognized that the literature on different types of institutional 
linkages stayed confined in the efforts to define various taxonomies of linkages 
whereas more empirically driven analysis that would also include novel mechanisms of 
governance is missing, various scholars moved to include discussions on firstly 
mapping institutional fragmentation and subsequently measuring its degree or 
recognizing various patterns that would emerge from the data. Keohane and Victor 
(2010) introduced the continuum ranging from a fully integrated regulatory systems 
with comprehensive, hierarchical rules at one end to fragmented arrangements with no 
identifiable core and weak or nonexistent linkages at other end. In between lie ‖nested 
regimes with identifiable cores and non-hierarchical but loosely-coupled systems of 
institutions‖ with some sort of connections but without overall architecture, they refer 
to as regime complex (Keohane and Victor, 2010, p. 4). Based on a case study of the 
climate regime complex, their attempts resulted in a map presented in Figure 3.1. 
Their mapping shows the fragmented nature of the climate regime complex, however 
it remains crude and lends itself to much interpretation in terms of where to draw the 
boundaries and to what degree the regime complex is fragmented. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The International Regime Complex for managing Climate Change Regime 
Complex. Source (Keohane and Victor, 2010) 
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Finally, while the regime complex approach and the institutional interplay literature 
predominately focus on examining the international level of governance and formal 
legally binding rules and regulations, emerging transnational level of the governance 
and informal norms and soft law are rarely recognized (Abbott, 2011). Accordingly, in 
efforts to include emerging modes of governance, namely the transnational regulatory 
space such as voluntary norms and standard setting arrangements, Abbott and Snidal 
(2009) introduced the governance triangle. It offers empirical analysis of the 
emergence and distribution of such schemes, and later on it allows for theoretical 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of different structures (ibid.). Based on the 
participation of three key actors, namely states, firms and NGOs, and the possible 
combinations of actor participation they mapped various arrangements that emerged 
in transnational climate change regime (Figure 3.2) (Abbott, 2011).  
 
Figure 3.2 The Transnational Climate Change Regime Complex. Source (Abbott, 
2011). 
In a similar attempt to map the transnational level of global climate architectures, 
Bulkley and colleagues have gathered a database with 60 initiatives focusing on 
transnational climate governance (2012). These initiatives epitomize the emerging 
phenomenon of actors other than national governments that engage in global 
environmental governance and presents an additional dimension to the institutional 
interplay and fragmentation debate. Bulkley and colleagues have managed to shed 
light on the structure, functions and types of transnational governance initiatives 
active in climate change. It remains however to be seen how they interact with the 
more formal, international level and governments, as well as with international 
organizations. 
The past 15 years of scholarship on linkages has provided much insight into the types 
of institutional interaction and the literature ―remains littered with taxonomies‖ (Selin 
and VanDeveer, 2003). Focus has also shifted from dyadic relations between source 
and target institutions, to regime complexes and architectures, and slowly connections 
are being made between interlinkages between international and transnational levels. 
Baby-steps have even been taken towards determining the degree of fragmentation in 
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global governance architectures in an issue area. Much work is still needed to 
determine degrees of fragmentation in global governance architectures in order to 
enable comparative studies to be made between issue areas, for example climate 
change and biodiversity. In the next section, the mapping is left behind to make place 
for possible reasons and causes of fragmentation.  
3.2 Causes of fragmentation 
After presenting different approaches to map and categorize interlinkages, and 
measure degrees of fragmentation, in global environmental governance, this next 
section explores the causes of fragmentation. To explain the fragmentation of global 
governance, scholars have come to different conclusions on why fragmentation occurs. 
The literature can be divided into three segments by invoking the three contemporary 
mainstream approaches in International Relations (IR): neo-realism, neo-liberal 
institutionalism and social constructivism. The three traditions complement each other 
by focusing on different explanatory variables, namely the role of power, interest and 
knowledge, in efforts to explain the nature of increased fragmentation of global 
governance. 
According to neo-realism, the structure of the international system, characterized with 
a lack of common power or central authority to enforce rules and maintain order in the 
system, shapes state behaviour (Waltz, 1979).  Here, power is defined as the combined 
capabilities of a state, which positions a state in the international system and in turn 
shapes its behaviour (ibid.). In an anarchical world, international politics is composed 
of sovereign nation-states who motivated by rivalry seek to increase their power in 
order to fulfil their interests, which are to survive (O‘neill 2009, Weber, 2009).  
Accordingly, states would never give up their power to a world government and 
therefore the lasting cooperation is very unlike to stay, whereas only if the most 
powerful states, the Hegemons, are willing to act, is cooperation possible (ibid.). One 
can observe that today there is an increasing body of research that utilized neo-realism 
as a theoretical lens in the efforts to explain fragmentation. 
Looking at global energy governance, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen argues that the 
multiplication of initiatives outside the UN-channels is the result of normative and 
institutional vacuum on energy within the UN (2010). The vacuum has been created by 
states‘ unwillingness to engage in substantial global energy governance at the UN-level 
due to energy‘s profile as an national security instead of collective security issue 
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2010). In a similar vein de Coninck and Bäckstrand (2011), 
when discussing the global Carbon Capture and Storage (CSS) governance, explain the 
gradual transfer of information-provision from the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate 
Change (IPCC) the International Energy Agency, by looking at power configurations. 
The IEA is, according to the authors, more in line with the interest and under control 
by industrialized states with large stake in CCS technologies and dependent on fossil 
fuels (de Coninck and Bäckstrand, 2011). National interest is also the central theme for 
states to decide whether to take action or not. Harris (2009, p. 968), in his review of 
the US role in international environmental and climate policy negotiations, argues that 
―...the United States seeks to maintain its sovereignty and retain its ability to act 
unilaterally. It resists mandates from international organizations, and it is sceptical of 
following what it sees as the potential decrees of international bureaucrats‖. In the 
same line, much of the literature on ‖leaders and laggards‖ in environmental policy 
making resembles realist account of world politics where the role of leader countries in 
setting regulatory trends in the emerging policy field is seen as dominant (Christoph, 
2012). What Karlsson-Vinkhuizen, de Coninck and Bäckstrand, Harris, and Christoph 
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describe are realist perspectives on international affairs where cooperation towards 
solving common governance problems, such as energy, climate change or biodiversity, 
is difficult since states pursue self-interest and are wary of others making relative 
gains and free-ride, and institutions are merely created to support the already powerful 
states. While institutions probably matter more in environmental governance than 
realists would lead us to believe, it is plausible to think that the fragmentation and the 
strength of global environmental efforts are, at least partly, the result of the interests 
of powerful states (Falkner, 2005). 
While realists certainly bring important insights to the table, interest-based accounts 
such as neo-liberal institutionalism have been more popular. It is a tradition rich in 
theoretical accounts ranging from regime theory to global governance theory, and the 
notion of regime complexes, where the concept of fragmentation has particular 
resonance.  Neo-liberal institutionalism implies that all states in world politics have 
only one meaningful identity, that of a-priori self-interested states, but institutions 
matter when shaping state interests since there is a functional need for international 
regimes in a world characterized by collective action problems (Hopf, 1998). Under 
this scenario, cooperation is achieved when states can work together to realize joint 
gains, and when institutions are set up so they can monitor compliance, increase 
transparency, reduce the transaction costs of cooperation, and prevent free-riding 
(O‘Neill 2009). Institutionalists assign non-state actors, such as the United Nations, or 
NGOs important roles in fostering such transparency and enhancing cooperative 
agreements (ibid.). 
Young emphasizes two drivers of institutional interaction, namely ‗functional‘ and 
‗political‘ (Young, 2002). First, functional interdependencies occur when the problems 
or activities that two or more institutions address are linked in bio geophysical or 
socioeconomic terms (e.g. UNFCCC, ozone regimes, CBD); secondly, they may arise 
through political or strategic linkages when actors strategically decide to forge 
connections between two or more institutions in order to reach individual or collective 
goals (e.g. Joint funding mechanisms such as GEF (ibid.). In a sense, building on 
Young‘s argument, causes of fragmentation can be both the unintended result of 
linkages between issue areas and their governing institutions, or, it could be the 
intended result of strategizing actors. In line with the second way of reasoning and in 
an effort to explain the causes of institutional change and innovation in the context of 
global energy governance over the past 40 years, Colgan and colleagues (2012) 
examined the strategies that actors employ to create institutional change.  Basing their 
assumption on the notion of politics as reflecting the interests of actors with the 
highest degree of power resources, Colgan and his colleagues argue that change 
occurs when dissatisfaction in the status quo of regime complex is high. Yet large 
structural change only happens when powerful actors desire change. Other dissatisfied 
actors, however, can engage in so-called ―forum shopping‖ which is later described in 
this article (Colgan et al., 2012). They also explain institutional change as path-
dependent, driven by sporadic events and dissatisfaction among major actors with 
similar interests creating coalitions in support of action for change (ibid.). Path-
dependency means that new or adapted institutions reflects the previous 
arrangements mainly because the transaction costs are kept low by retaining some 
organizational routines (ibid.). In the same line, Keohane and Victor (2010) argue that 
in order to exercise bargaining power states can form ―clubs‖ based on the shared set 
of features, such as interests, power resources, information and beliefs. Moreover, 
Keohane and Victor (2010) argue that there is a linear correlation between the diversity 
of problem structure and the diversity of institutions that aim to tackle the problem. In 
addition they argue that comprehensive integrated regimes occur when: a) powerful 
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actors share the same or similar interests and b) their rule systems are 
institutionalized in a single institution. On contrary, fragmented regimes occur when 
several narrow regimes coexist in the same issue area without clear hierarchy or core 
and yet they are loosely coupled/linked system of institutions. In these situations, 
conflicts among actors are likely to occur (Keohane and Victor, 2010).  
Moving towards less state-centred perspectives on the structure of global governance, 
scholars also recognize that there is a growing web of actors beyond the state, such as 
informal networks of governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and 
business with overlapping spheres of authority (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Rosenau 
and Czempiel, 1992). Recently, discussions moved to include the role of transnational 
governance in the policy making process (Ford, 2010). The emergence of new actor 
constellations and institutions is a large cause of fragmentation, however, the exact 
pathways telling us the reasons why, are less well understood. Visseren-Hamkers and 
Glasbergen argue that private regulation, such as partnerships, is a result of gaps in 
governance that need to be filled (2007). Pattberg also points at macro-level reasons 
for example changes in world politics such as dissipation of authority among state and 
non-state actors, and micro-level reasons such as problem structure and the capacities 
of individual organizations (2005). 
Finally, more constructivist and ―knowledge-based‖ perspectives offer ideas stressing 
the cognitive and normative aspects of problem-formation (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004).  
In the fragmentation debate, the emergence of new actors and institutions beyond the 
nation state, has boosted the explanatory power of constructivism. Constructivism 
criticizes realist and neoliberal institutionalism ―rationalist‖ accounts of choice 
assumptions, where interests of states are defined a priori and shaped by exclusive 
material power do not fit well in the environmental context where any claim certainties 
are often limited (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004). Constructivism stresses the evolution 
and role of norms, discourses, identity, culture, knowledge and values, as well as the 
role of non-state actors, such as scientists, networks and civil society operating at 
different scales can have in shaping world politics. Here, interests are not pre-defined 
and can be shaped and formed among state and non-state actors through not only 
material power, but also through normative and discursive shifts or through the power 
of knowledge, ideas, cultures, ideology (Hopf, 1998). 
While constructivist approaches have been good in explaining fragmentation as a 
phenomenon, they have paid less attention to understanding why it occurs. Some 
scholars have looked into the motivations of non-state actors to engage in 
transnational governance. Risse, for example, argues that the motivation depends on 
the type of actor. Companies and special interest groups for example have 
instrumental reasons such as promoting the future of the groups or lobby interest, 
whereas many NGOs for example, have a more altruistic  idea of supporting the 
―international common good‖ (2007). That having said, there is little understanding 
why some norms and issues are pursued and other not by non state actors. The 
importance of norm entrepreneurs is for example well acknowledged (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998), however, why an entrepreneur chooses one norm over another is not 
clear. Also Carpenter, in her analysis of advocacy networks, argues that the 
construction and accepting of international issues in first place – what she calls ―issue 
emergence― – remains an understudied aspect of transnational governance (2007). Yet 
she mentions a few possible explanations. Based on Keck and Sikkink (1998), the first 
is issue attributes basically saying that some problems are better suited for advocacy 
than others. The second one is the presence of pre-existing moral standards around 
an issue. Third, the altruistic and conviction of individual leaders could also explain 
the emergence of a norm (Carpenter, 2007). While constructivism clearly provides an 
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alternative perspective on ―rational‖ interest and power based theories, it fails to 
provide a convincing narrative for the emergence of fragmentation. This is probably 
more a problem of neglect than weak spot in the theory, but nevertheless a gap in 
knowledge from a theoretical perspective. 
In conclusion, we find surprisingly few theories trying to explain the causes of 
fragmentation. Path-dependency accounts is an exception where the general line of 
thinking is that the size and number of institutions have increased as they try to 
respond to emerging problems however, due to old habits, there is little room for 
innovation and what is left is a patchwork of centres of authority. Actors and 
institutions, be they state or non-state, contribute to the fragmentation either by 
starting up new, competing initiatives, filling governance gaps, or actually, increasing 
complexity and perhaps confusion, to their own gains. Scholars focusing on the 
transnational explain the causes of fragmentation as symptomatic of large-scale trends 
such as globalization however they lack a clear theory on why some norms emerge and 
get picked up by policy entrepreneurs and other not. Such a theory would be needed 
to explain variation in causes for fragmentation. A central question for research on the 
causes of fragmentation is to understand to what extent actors deliberately increase 
fragmentation or not. 
3.3 Consequences of fragmentation 
In order to develop future effective architectures for global environmental governance, 
many of the studies reviewed in this chapter address the potential costs and benefits 
of fragmented governance architectures emphasizing either the value of diverse set of 
governance arrangements or the importance of the integrated overall architecture. 
Consequently, this chapter will group this body of research according to those that 
emphasize the disadvantages and on the other hand potential advantages of 
fragmented global governance. 
Major debates within international law literature on the negative consequences of 
fragmented governance are that it may lead to regulatory and legal uncertainty (Zelli 
and van Asselt, 2012). Other negative outcomes associated with fragmentation include 
high transaction costs and duplication of efforts, as well as that it may lead to 
significant lack of coordination institutions,  actors, sectors and levels (Benvenisti and 
Downs, 2007; F. Biermann et al., 2010; Zelli and van Asselt, 2012). Moreover, other 
argue that fragmentation of the international regulatory order resulted in an increased 
and steady influence of the powerful states lead by their own domestic interests thus 
determining the process of democratization of international institutions and 
negotiations  (Biermann et al. 2010, Benvenisti and Downs, 2007). 
Particular resonance within the literature on the negative effects of fragmentation has 
the concept of regime or venue shifting. Benvenisti and Downs (2007) view 
fragmentation as strategic action of powerful states in perpetuating their dominance at 
the international level through the creation of a large number of broad agreements 
which makes it difficult for weaker states to come to agreement on any particular 
issue. However, they also claim that the weaker states engage in strategic action as 
well in order to pursue their goals, such as turning to pre-existing policies, pursuing 
particular opportunities among multiplicity of arenas and finally reaching international 
bureaucrats and judges (ibid.). Besides the concept of regime shifting, particular 
emphasis is placed on the phenomenon of ―forum shopping‖ as well. Kellow (2012, 
p.333)  refers to forum shopping as ―a strategy of selecting arenas because of the 
benefits conferred by institutional characteristics and using these to progress or 
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inhibit the development of policy initiatives‖. Moreover, besides viewing forums as 
arenas where particular actors strategically draw to in search of advantages and better 
chances of success, he sees forums as active actors seeking for the participation of 
―shoppers‖ in negotiations in order to build their legitimacy. He emphasizes deliberate 
and strategic actions of policy entrepreneurs such as reference to various agreements 
and commitments (ibid.). Alter and Meunier (2009) argue that such developments 
resulted from a changing nature of international system of governance as non-
hierarchical and without a clear central decision-making body. 
On the other hand, in her study on the creation of formal governance strategies for 
fostering cooperation and other linkages among MEAs, Scott (2011) challenges the 
very negative notion of the concept of fragmentation of international environmental 
law within the ―fundamentalist‖ literature of international law. She shows that it is not 
only conflictive regulatory mandates that give rise to fragmentation, but divergent 
standards or the development of different managerial approaches to environmental 
problems as well. Moreover, considering that fragmentation can have both costs and 
benefits, she emphasizes that the managerial efforts should not aim at eliminating 
fragmentation but instead should focus on recognizing them first and later 
increasing/maximizing its benefits and potential while reducing risks (Scott, 2011). 
International legal theorists from the neoliberal institutionalist tradition argue that 
fragmentation should be viewed as a gradually evolving, realistic and more effective 
response to globalization than centralized, hierarchical and coherent form of 
international legal system. In the same lane, scholars argue that fragmented legal 
system fits more to an increasingly networked world thus resulting in a higher share of 
benefits then associated costs and thus should be nurtured through informal 
agreements, dialogue and respect (Burke-White, 2003). Moreover, legal theorists from 
a post-modernist or constructivist tradition (Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002) view 
fragmentation and associated competing normative structures even as a more positive 
development and response to an increasingly transforming international system and 
social change. Finally, drawing from a literature on public administration Kellow (2012) 
argues that fragmentation, duplication, overlap, pluralism, multiple arenas and multi-
level governance should be considered as a necessary and to some extent unavoidable 
structural characteristic of governance in so that it creates opportunities for further 
development of environmental policies through forum shopping, policy innovation, 
redundancy, consensus building and negotiations. 
Finally, Abbott (2013) argues that some of the benefits relate to flexibility of the 
system to adapt and address emerging and dynamic problem issues across different 
scales, opportunities for the actors sharing similar interests and values to form 
productive clubs, as well as opportunities for learning and experimentation. Along the 
same line, Keohane and Victor (2010) emphasize the value of flexibility and 
adaptability of a regime complex in coping with uncertainties associated with the 
process of governing complex human-environment interactions. Accordingly, great 
deal of literature emphasized the potential of fragmented governance in diffusion of 
innovations and opportunities for the innovation of policies and policy instruments 
(Kellow, 2012), for experimentation of alternative regulatory frameworks and learning 
(Zelli and van Asselt 2012), diversification of actors, division of labour, transfer of 
functions to other institutions (F. Biermann et al., 2010) and overall lead to what is call 
the notion of the diffusion of innovation including policies, technologies, procedures 
and ideas (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008). 
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3.4 Managing fragmentation 
While most of the approaches for managing fragmentation are essentially grounded in 
divergent views on the causes of fragmentation, recently it has been emphasized that 
the research needs to integrate normative perspectives for managing fragmentation as 
well. For example, Biermann and colleagues (2009) argue that the advantages of 
fragmented governance architecture overweight associated costs and emphasize that 
systems should be managed as to avoid the cases of conflictive fragmentation. On the 
other hand, others argue that the standard of coherence should be a criteria for 
assessments where the actions to increase coordination in global governance should 
be enacted (Keohane and Victor, 2010) as it would ensure the achievement of the same 
goals, or lead to increased level of transparency and trust (Falkner et al. 2010 in (Van 
Asselt and Zelli, 2012). Others look for ways of coordinating distinct institutions and 
regulatory systems (Van Asselt and Zelli, 2012).  Therefore, in this chapter we will 
provide an outlook of the distinct approaches for managing fragmentation in the 
literature. 
The creation of some form of an International Environmental Organization (IEO) or a 
World Environment Organization (WEO) resonated much of the literature where 
improved communication and cooperation through bridging information and decision 
making gaps are emphasized as a two-fold strategy for overcoming fragmentation and 
increasing governance effectiveness (Biermann and Bauer, 2005). The rationale behind 
the creation of an overarching international environmental institution lies in increased 
efficiency among MEAs, increased normative and procedural advantage of international 
environmental law to other better coordinated fields of international law and finally 
increased legitimacy of international law as a central component in addressing 
environmental problems (ibid.). The role of such an institution would be to consolidate 
organizational mandates, decision making and administrative structures, as well as 
establish stable funding sources and strengthen monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms. Some argue that upgraded UNEP could fit this role, while 
others emphasize the important role secretariats may play in increasing coordination 
among MEAs through disseminating information to state parties and influencing COP 
decision making (ibid.). In this line, some of the legal scholars propagate for a creation 
of a comprehensive legal system that would increase the legitimacy of international 
law and use it as a central component in addressing environmental issues (Carlarne, 
2008). 
On the other hand, others argue that the creation of WEO or IEO would not fit the 
complex problem structure of the environment, but instead call for clustering, that is 
for grouping a number of international environmental regimes together so as to make 
them more efficient and effective by utilizing various tools for clustering and based on 
the same problem structure (Von Moltke, 2005). A number of institutions were 
identified that could have an important role in clustering, such as the conference of 
the parties, subsidiary bodies, secretariats, then tools, such as electronic clustering, 
purposeful use of financial incentives, communications, capacity building (ibid.). The 
examples of clusters would include the Conservation Cluster, the Hazardous 
Substances Cluster, the Marine Environment Cluster, etc. (ibid.). 
Besides these concrete options based on the creation of new institutions, others 
developed more sophisticated models for managing fragmentation. Stokke (2011, p. 
143) developed a framework for analyzing strategic interplay management decisions 
based on several institutional niches or governance tasks that may be employed for 
solving particular environmental problems within larger institutional complexes. 
Interplay management involves efforts to impede, trigger or shape the impacts one 
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institution might have on another through a strategic selection of governance tasks 
(Stokke 2011). These governance tasks include 1) recognition of the severity of the 
problem and how effective different approaches for solving it might be, 2) elaboration 
of behavioural norms, 3) implementation of such norms through for example funding 
or capacity building, 4) rule enforcement. 
In exploring such alternative modes of governance, Abbott and colleagues (2012) 
focus on orchestration as a promising way of improving the performance of 
international organizations and global governance. In orchestration, one actor or a set 
of actors, referred to as the Orchestrator, works through a second actor, the 
Intermediary, to govern a third actor, the Target. In international governance 
organizations (IGOs) orchestration, the intermediary actors are usually NGOs, but may 
also involve business organizations, public-private partnerships, transgovernmental 
networks and other IGOs. Intermediaries have the crucial role since they possess those 
capabilities that IGOs lack. The targets of IGOs orchestration may be either states or 
private entities. It is emphasized that an orchestrator does not govern the target 
directly and through hierarchical modes of governance as it depends on the support 
provided by intermediaries and vice versa (ibid.). While intermediaries support IGOs by 
providing local information, technical expertise, enforcement capacity, material 
resources, legitimacy and direct access to resources, IGOs strengthen the governance 
capabilities of intermediaries as well by providing material support, such as financial 
and administrative assistance, or with ideational support, such as technical expertise, 
formal approval or political endorsement. Moreover, in order to provide their support, 
IGOs can steer goals and values of intermediaries in line with their own goals. 
Accordingly, in order to reach governance goals and regulate the behaviour of target 
actors, IGOs may involve in „managing states― by enlisting intermediaries to shape 
their behaviour in accordance with their goals, or in „bypassing states― by enlisting 
intermediaries to influence the conduct of private actors without state intermediation 
(ibid.). Thus, orchestration, as Abbott argues, serves to create and enforce common 
rules for the conduct of states based on the same shared goals and values and mutual 
support through symbiotic interaction between an orchestrator and intermediary, and 
in this case state and non-state actors thus constituting a multi-level governance 
system. However, although Abbott (2013) argues against a tightly integrated 
transnational regime, he does, however, recognizes potential benefits in stronger 
horizontal coordination within the same type of institutions at the same level and 
stronger vertical coordination across different types of institutions operating at 
different levels. 
One example of IGOs orchestration is the influence UNEP has exercised over private 
actors to adopt the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) by collaborating with the 
environmental NGO CERES (Dingwerth 2007). Another example includes the potential 
of the UNFCCC as an orchestrator in facilitating and coordinating the wide variety of 
bottom-up approaches, which would in general overcome the view of the UNFCCC as a 
top-down institution for implementing climate policies (Abbott and Snidal, 2010). 
Moreover, Abbott (2013) recently emphasized the potential role of transnational 
institutions and networks in improving overall governance performance. For example, 
he called for constructing transnational climate change regime (TCCR) as an 
―orchestrator‖ that would include private organizations, public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), associations of sub-state governments, transgovernmental networks of national 
agencies and IGOs. Through information sharing, managing and bypassing states, as 
well as linking organizations vertically, TCCR would reach and mobilize other actors 
than the state, contribute to information sharing, strengthen weak institutions and 
create new ones to fill governance gaps, encourage horizontal linkages and inter-
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institutional cooperation, as well as build vertical linkages to support and steer lower-
level institutions (Abbott, 2013). 
Moreover, in international law literature it is argued that although the international law 
perspective cannot comprehensively address the fragmentation of global 
environmental governance, it can provide a useful insight when examining conflicts 
and exploring avenues for increasing synergies and mutual supportiveness between 
environmental and non-environmental treaties (Van Asselt, 2007). In addition, a special 
focus should be placed on recognizing how different regimes and norms could achieve 
synergies and reinforce each other in a non-hierarchical manner instead of merely 
looking at potential conflicts that may arise among them (Van Asselt, 2011; Scott, 
2011; Commission, 2006). When treaties share the same concepts in their objectives, 
e.g. sustainable development (Rio Conventions: the UNFCCC, the CBD and UNCCD or 
ecosystem approach), there is a potential for cooperation. Therefore, instead of 
managing conflicts between regimes by enforcing treaties, international legal scholars 
argue for the need of the creation of governance mechanisms and tools that would 
increase the benefits associated with fragmentation and avoid conflicts. Some of these 
mechanisms, which are both legally binding but also of political and administrative 
nature, are the creation of institutional cooperative arrangements and formal linkages 
between MEAs, the memorandum of understanding, partnerships, development of joint 
work programmes, the creation of joint rules and institutions, meetings (Scott, 2011). 
Accordingly, in the case of the post-2012 climate negotiations, when the proliferation 
of climate initiatives beyond the UNFCCC emerged, it is argued that the role of the 
UNFCCC post 2012 has to be reconsidered from thinking in terms of its centrality in 
climate negotiations to multiplicity of actors and plurality of governance (Van Asselt 
and Zelli, 2012). In case of climate change it is to redirect attention to fostering 
linkages between individual components of the existing global climate governance 
architecture, as opposed to searching for ideal governance architecture – and to 
provide some first ideas on how such linkages could look like at the intersection of 
climate change mitigation and trade policies (ibid.). Coordination could avoid the 
duplication of work in case of overlapping initiatives, link it to the assessment of the 
countries‘ technology needs, and keep the track of how technology transfer could 
contribute to the overall climate mitigation objectives. UNFCCC could increase and 
strengthen their previous functions, e.g.  information and knowledge sharing, support 
technology hubs and innovation networks, capacity building and technology needs 
assessments, form the focal point for the provision of public funds (Van Asselt and 
Zelli, 2012). 
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4 Conclusion 
Questions on how to reform and evolve global institutions responsible for ensuring 
sustainable development in an effective and legitimate manner are at the heart of 
debates in academic research as well as in policy processes and negotiations ever 
since the first international conference on global environmental change in 1972. 
However, comparative, theory driven and empirically based research on the global 
environmental governance from the overall institutional perspective in an important 
issue area of world politics that we conceive of as global governance architectures is 
still missing. The CONNECT project focuses on one aspect of global governance 
architecture that is increasingly moving to the centre of debates among the scholars of 
international law and political science and policy makers, the fragmentation. 
As this literature review paper shows, the concept of fragmentation has evolved from 
various legal debates on strengthening the overall international system of law and 
ensuring legal certainty, to resembling more established literature on global 
environmental governance in the context of today‘s transformations of world politics. 
The concept of fragmentation within the framework of global governance architecture 
is a promising lens where each of the disciplines of international law and political 
science could theoretically and methodologically merge. Moreover, when considering 
common analytical problems that these two disciplines address under the auspices of 
various taxonomies of fragmentation, namely mapping and measuring the degree of 
fragmentation, examining its causes and consequences and management approaches, 
one can conclude that the different accounts of these analytical problems are 
essentially not conflictive, but instead complementary to each other. Therefore, one 
would need to employ a whole spectrum of perspectives, approaches and tools in 
order to address these four analytical themes associated with the fragmentation of 
global governance and accordingly propose concrete management and policy options 
for increasing the overall institutional performance in terms of sustainable 
development. 
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